Posts tagged ‘israel’
Knesset Proposes Bill to End Domestic Fur Sales
From the Israel Law Blog by Judah Fish:
July 30, 2012
The JPost reported on a proposed bill to make Israel the first country to ban fur sales nationally. Due to Israel’s generally warm climate I’m not sure this will be a big issue for most people. In case you are wondering, there is a carve-out for shtreimels, the fur has worn by many chassidic Jews. Also, fur imports will still be permitted.For a related story, see here and here about the court fight regarding an Israeli company’s export of macaque monkeys to the US for biomedical research. In that case, the Supreme Court allowed the company to export only the monkeys that were raised in captivity but not those captured in the wild. However, El Al, Israel’s national airlines, in response to public pressure said that it would not transport monkeys for the purposes of experimentation.Also, another JPost articlereports that the Cabinet recently approved a measure prohibiting chicken farmers from starving hens in order to encourage them to lay more eggs, a process known asforced molting, beginning January 1, 2013. Also, the sizes of battery cages will have to be increased to bring Israel in line with European standards. **And an article from the JPost on August 19, reports that a raid on a pig farm also found inhumane conditions as well as potential violations concerning the pollution of groundwater from swine refuse. Apparently the laws on pig farming are fairly lax.**
To read the full article, click here.
Hunting for Sport in the Modern State of Israel
Jewish Law in Our Times
by Simon M. Jackson, Adv., Legal Advisor to Torah MiTzion
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– Jewish Law in the Debates of the Knesset –
At the time the draft Wildlife Protection Bill was debated in the Knesset (1955), several MKs voiced their displeasure at the fact that the bill, although beneficial in what it did prohibit, did not go far enough – in that it failed to prohibit the hunting of animals for sport, entertainment and pleasure.
On the first reading of the bill, MKs Zerach Werhaftig and Eliyahu-Moshe Gonachovsky, both members of HaPoel HaMizrachi, cited sources to illustrate how the hunting of animals as a pastime is antithetical to the Torah’s outlook.
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MK Werhaftig stated:
“I object to the permit that this law gives to the hunting of wild animals for entertainment or sport, and my objection stems from the traditional Jewish opposition to hunting…
To illustrate this, I will cite from one of the later responsa, the ruling given by the “Noda BiYehuda,” who, when questioned whether a Jew was permitted to engage in hunting or not, analyzes all the possibilities in his responsum, both in terms of the suffering caused to the animals (tza’ar ba’alei haim), as well as in terms of the law against wanton destruction (bal tashchit), and he arrives at the following conclusion:
It is true that in case of human need, no account need be taken of tza’ar ba’alei haim, because Judaism considers that man is the center of the creation, and he is given free reign over the animal kingdom for his needs, but only for his needs, where required. It is always necessary to measure the proportion between the human need factor and the suffering caused to the animal. In general, if it is necessary in order to preserve the human species, for food, the animal may be killed… But it is forbidden to exceed this permit, for the sake of pleasure… In our tradition we do not find any Jewish hunters, and if any huntsmen are found in the Torah – Nimrod and Eisav – they were not Jewish; for it is not a Jewish quality to be a hunter purely as a pastime or for sport…
And the “Noda BiYehuda” therefore writes that, even if, from the legal viewpoint, it can be argued whether to hunt is permissible or prohibited, this is not a trait of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov; ‘for how can a Jew put to death an animal, for no purpose other than to wile away his time in the pursuit of hunting… Anyone who listens to me will remain in the tranquility of his home, and will not waste his time in such pursuits.’”
This last point of the “Noda BiYehuda” was echoed by MK Ganochovsky as well:
“I think that the Minister of Agriculture needs to attend to the destruction of dangerous animals, but he also needs to fight against the sport, against the pastime of hunting animals. We need to provide the nation with different kinds of pastime…”
Afterwards, on the second and third reading, HaPoel HaMizrachi MK Michael Chazani, submitted a list of reservations to the wording of the law, with the aim of prohibiting the hunting of wild animals entirely, save where dangerous, or where hunting would further scientific goals, or where the animal is spreading contagious diseases. He, too, relied on Jewish tradition, and noted that Jews have never been engaged in hunting, and always regarded such pastimes as the characteristic of the wicked Esav:
“One of the distinguishing characteristics which has historically shaped the spiritual and ethical image of our people… as noted by the Education Minister, is the compassion and sensitivity towards causing suffering to animals. The people of Israel, or the Jews, are a merciful people, and Jews always educated themselves and their children to this ideal – eschewing cruelty to human beings and to animals, and despising hunting as an occupation, and certainly as a sport and a pastime.
It seems to me true to say that Jews have engaged in every profession to which they only had access… including the Army as a profession, as hired soldiers. But Jews have never engaged in hunting, neither when they lived in Israeland certainly not when in the exile. The Jew always regarded hunting as the work of Esav, of Edom, “for game (tzayid)was in his mouth.” If a Jewish child wished to imagine Esav, he would depict him as the epitome of the gentile huntsman, of ruddy complexion, with a feather in his cap and a gun on his shoulders, carrying a chain of rabbits and hares dripping with blood around his waist. The same was true for Esav’s descendants.”
The reservations of MK Chazani were not accepted (by a small majority), and the bill thus became law, without outlawing the pastime of hunting for hunting’s sake.
Some nine years later, in 1963, a private members bill was introduced by MK Shlomo Lorenz of the “Agudat Yisrael” party. This bill aimed to amend the Wildlife Protection Law and to outlaw hunting for the sake of entertainment and sport as being “against the law of the Jewish People, against tradition and the Jewish ethos, injurious to nature conservation, and (by virtue of the noise caused by the shots) a disturbance to rest.”
MK Lorenz pointed out to the Knesset that the Wildlife Protection Law was merely a Hebrew translation of the EnglishLaw, but was not “Jewish” or “Hebrew” in content. He focused on the unique traits of the Jewish People: “compassion, reserve and piety” (citing Yevamot 79), and noted that however far Jews strayed from the fold throughout the generations they never lost these three traits – and in particular the first.
Section 4(b) of the Law prohibited a person to hunt by shooting in a manner “likely to cause damage to electricity, telephone and telegraph wires.” All the more so, argued MK Lorenz, that we should prohibit “shots which are likely to injure those hidden wires which constitute the character traits of the Hebrew nation.”
“We must uproot the notion that murder, even the killing of an animal or bird, can be entertaining; that the affliction of others can generate happiness and pleasure… I urge the Knesset to approve the draft legislation, not only for the protection of wildlife, but also, and mainly, for the protection of man to ensure that he does not become wild himself.”
Sadly, MK Lorenz’s proposal to transfer the draft bill to committee for deliberation was not accepted.
Other articles in the series:
‘Animal Welfare’ v. ‘Human Benefit’: Which Comes First?
Jewish Law in Our Times
by Simon M. Jackson, Adv., Legal Advisor to Torah MiTzion
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The Torah instructs Adam to “have dominion over… every living thing that creeps on the earth” (Bereshit1:28). After Noach and his sons left the Ark, Hashem gave them the blessing that “the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth… into your hand are they delivered” (Bereshit 9:1-2). Indeed, both Nimrod and Esav were hunters.
Does man have absolute mastery over the animal kingdom as the above verse and practices would seem to imply? Will ‘human benefit’ always override considerations of ‘animal welfare’?
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In our last column, we saw how Israel’s highest court did not see fit to delve into the age-old provisions of the Halacha, when arriving at its decision to outlaw the force feeding of geese.
In Jewish Law, the prohibition of causing cruelty to animals (tza’ar ba’alei haim) is not an absolute prohibition, and it may be set aside when it conflicts with human needs. “Hashem’s mercies do not extend to the animal kingdom, in order to prevent us from using animals for our needs” (Ramban, Devarim 22:6). Nonetheless, we will soon see that the Halachic Poskim are divided over the question: what is the boundary line between a need which justifies causing suffering to animals and a need which does not justify such suffering? The permissibility or otherwise of force-feeding geese would appear to revolve around precisely this issue.
The Lenient Position
Rema, R. Moshe Isserles (16th century Poland), rules, in his gloss to the Shulchan Aruch (Even Haezer 5:14): “Anything which is necessary in order to effect a cure or for other matters does not entail a violation of the prohibition againsttza’ar ba’alei haim… It is therefore permitted to pluck feathers from live geese [in order to obtain quills for writing] and there is no concern on account of tza’ar ba’alei haim.” Nevertheless, Rema concludes, “people refrain from doing so because it constitutes an act of cruelty.” This approach is accepted by the majority of Halachic codifiers, as we will now see.
R. Yaakov Reischer (18th century Prague) was asked whether or not a Jewish physician is permitted to test the effects of a new drug on an animal, such as a dog or cat, in order to discover whether it might prove injurious or even fatal before applying it to human beings. He rules as follows: “Provided there is some need involved – whether for medical uses or even for any financial gain – the act is excluded from the Biblical prohibitions of wanton destruction and cruelty to animals” (Shu”t Shvut Yaakov III:71).
In another responsum (ibid. II:110), R. Reischer addresses the practice of a number of Shochetim to make an incision in the animal’s neck before shechita, to enable them to more easily shecht the animal, by holding the trachea and the esophagus in one hand. He rules that this custom is prohibited, because the degree of benefit is only small… and, in particular, because it is against Minhag Yisrael (Jewish custom). This responsum is very significant for our question, because it implies that there is no blanket permission to cause suffering to animals, and there may be circumstances in which the slight benefit to man does not justify tza’ar ba’alei haim, especially where the act which causes the suffering is not usual amongst God-fearing Jews.
R. Moshe Sofer (19th century Hungary) writes that the prohibition against tza’ar ba’alei haim does not apply when the act is performed “for the benefit of human beings, their honor or financial benefit” (Shu”t Chatam Sofer, Y.D. 312). His inclusion of “human dignity” as a ground to permit tza’ar ba’alei haim refers to the permit given to an old man to refrain from assisting an animal stumbling under its heavy load, where such assistance would be “beneath his dignity.” Even the protection for human dignity can thus justify causing suffering to animals, and not only financial gain.
R. Yitzchak Ya’akov Weiss (20th century Poland-Israel) was asked whether it is permitted to deprive fifteen-month old hens of food for ten days in order to renew the hens’ ability to lay eggs by a further five months or longer. In his opinion (Shu”t Minchat Yitzchak VI:145), this need not be avoided, not even for reasons of piety (midat chasidut), for 3 reasons: (a) the act is one of omission only, not of commission; (b) the suffering caused is not that great, because the hens are allowed to drink; and (c) the hens themselves “benefit” as the time for their slaughter is thus prolonged.
Here it is appropriate to point out that R. Shmuel Wosner (Bnei Brak – one of the preeminent Poskim of our time in the Charedi world), disagrees regarding this issue. While he permits tza’ar ba’alei haim for financial gain, even if “a great degree of suffering” is caused to the animal, he argues that the starvation of hens causes them such an acute level of suffering that it constitutes “cruelty to the heart” (achzariut lev) and is therefore prohibited for financial gain (Shu”t Shevet HaLevi II:7).
The Stringent Position
The common denominator of the Poskim whose views we quoted above is that financial gain justifies tza’ar ba’alei haim, even if it causes a significant degree of suffering to the animal. However, some Poskim, especially those from the 19thcentury and onwards, have limited this permit, and others have rejected it totally.
R. Yitzchak Dov HaLevi Bamberger (19th century Germany) thus writes (Shu”t Yad HaLevi Y.D. 196): “The proof brought by the lenient Poskim, that all creatures were created only to serve man, is certainly true; however, this statement only proves that creatures must be used for the purpose for which they were created – an ox for yoking and a donkey for burdens – but to change their order of creation?!”
According to R. Bamberger, the prohibition of tza’ar ba’alei haim is only waived for medical purposes, but not for financial gain. Here, however, he expands the permit for other matters which, like medical needs, are “essential” (although the definition of this is not clear: would sustaining one’s family, as opposed to additional income, be essential?). On the other hand, he rules against medical trials whose benefit is not known in advance: for how can the prohibition against certain tza’ar ba’alei haim be overridden by a questionable benefit to man?
From the above, it can be concluded that the majority of Halachic codifiers permit tza’ar ba’alei haim for monetary gain, albeit that they express moral reservation against benefiting in this manner. In other words, it appears that, in their opinion, the question before us is one of conscience, in which the law will not intervene to enforce.
In our next column, we will discuss the scope of the permit of “financial gain.” At the end of the day, can the financial benefit obtained justify the suffering caused to animals in the course of bull or cock fights, or hunting as a sport? Can it justify the practice of force-feeding geese – all in the name of creating luxuries and gastronomic delicacies for human beings?
To be continued!
Other articles in the series:
‘Agricultural Need’ v. ‘Hunting for Sport’
Jewish Law in Our Times
by Simon M. Jackson, Adv., Legal Advisor to Torah MiTzion
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We ended our last column by concluding that the majority of Halachic codifiers permit tza’ar ba’alei haim for monetary gain, albeit that they all recoil morally from benefiting in this manner.
What is the scope of the permit of “financial gain”? Can it justify the practice of force-feeding geese – all in the name of creating luxuries and gastronomic delicacies for human beings? Can the financial benefits obtained justify the suffering caused to animals in the course of bull or cock fights, or hunting as a sport?
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It is very clear that the Halacha’s concession of allowing suffering to animals for financial gain does not imply any permit to derive benefit from the suffering per se. Bull fights, cock fights and similar shows and tournaments are therefore clearly forbidden by Halacha. Moreover, all authorities agree that hunting as a sport is forbidden, even though the organizers of the fight undoubtedly profit from their enterprise.
From this perspective, the Supreme Court ruling in Let the Animals Live v. Chamat Gader Recreation Enterprises[1] , which outlawed battles between man and alligator at the northern town of Chamat Gader, accorded perfectly with the principles of Jewish Law, and these principles were indeed cited extensively in the judgment.
The permit applies only where the suffering caused is merely a means for obtaining a product or a benefit, and even then, only where there is no possibility of obtaining these without causing the suffering. In other words, in the same manner as one may not obtain sadistic benefitfrom causing suffering to animals, so too it is forbidden to market such benefit, and evenif hundreds of households rely on this benefit for their livelihood, such invalid means of earning a living should cease immediately.
However, in the case of force-feeding geese, the situation is different: those involved in the industry are not interested in causing suffering to the geese, merely in their livers, and were alternative means available to achieve this purpose they would certainly adopt it!
Especially instructive in this regard is a response by Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igrot Moshe, Even Haezer IV:92), one of the greatest Poskim of the last generation, which deals expressly with a similar situation – the raising of calves for veal. This practice is mentioned several times in the Noah[2] judgment. Calf meat (veal), like goose liver, is a culinary delicacy. In order to get high quality veal, calves are raised under special conditions. The calves are kept in narrow stalls, which do not allow them room to move. They are also fed special food that does not contain iron. This is intended to make the meat as light colored as possible. This is done despite the fact that the calves need iron and, as a result of the lack of this necessary dietary element, they become anemic.
Rav Feinstein does, indeed, prohibit the raising of calves for veal. He rules that one who engages in this practice transgresses the prohibition of tza’ar ba’alei haim. However, from his reasoning, it is doubtful whether he would have reached the same conclusion with respect to the force-feeding of geese. On the contrary, it is logical to assume that Rav Feinstein would permit the practice, because his reasoning to forbid the raising of calves for veal is that the latter does not improve the meat, but merely changes its color to white, which thus appears more impressive than it actually is. In his opinion, the “gain” obtained by those who raise the calves from improving the appearance of the meat (and which in effect deceives purchasers of the meat) does not constitute a benefit which justifies the infliction of suffering on animals. The situation is very different in the case of force-feeding geese, which does in fact cause the liver to improve.
It should also be noted that Rav Feinstein emphasizes in his responsum that tza’ar ba’alei haim is permitted “in cases where people generally allow this,” i.e. specifically wherea commonly accepted benefit results. It would follow, therefore, that if it were not accepted practice to force-feed geese, the practice would be forbidden, but since the industry exists – darkan be’kach (“it is generally allowed”) – there is no Halachic basis to stop its practice, save where alternative means exist to obtain the same result without causing tza’ar ba’alei haim[3] or where such suffering can be minimized.
From the above it follows that, had the Supreme Court taken into consideration the principles of Jewish Law over the ages as to the appropriate balance between human needs and animal welfare, it may well have reached a different conclusion from one which outlawed the practice of force-feeding geese.
Hunting for Sport in the Modern State of Israel
In Israel, the issue of hunting for sport is regulated in the Wildlife Protection Law, 5715 (1955).
This law authorizes the Minister of the Environment to restrict the hunting of wild animals, to issue hunting permits and to appoint inspectors to enforce the law. It prohibits trading, possessing or transporting protected species without a permit. It requires a hunting license for game hunting (hare, wild boar, partridge and some duck species) or for the extermination of pests, and prohibits the hunting of protected species, except by special permit and for specific purposes listed in the law.
However, while the law does restrict the hunting season and hunting areas, and also prohibits certain methods of hunting (traps, explosives, poisoning), hunting of mammals per se is thus still permitted in Israel!
Final Column: Knesset attempts to change the law on hunting for sport!
[1] Cited extensively in our first column on this subject – see Issue No. 58 of this publication. To read an English translation of this judgment, see www.court.gov.il – English Courtdecisions – LCA 1684/96.
[2] Noah – The Israeli Federation of Animal Protection Organizations;discussed at length in Issue No. 58 of this publication. To read an English translation of this judgment, see www.court.gov.il – English Courtdecisions – HCJ 9232/01.
[3] It follows that scientific experiments upon laboratory animals during the course of medical research designed to yield information that might lead to cure of disease will only be sanctioned by Jewish law provided alternative means of obtaining the same information are unavailable (e.g. tissue culture studies). Where alternative means do exist, animal experimentation might be considered to fall under the category of unnecessary cruelty to animals and be prohibited.
Other articles in the series:
Animals in Halacha 